Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
We develop an index theory for the Stationary Subgame Perfect (SSP) equilibrium set in a class of n-player $(n\ge 2)$ sequential bargaining games with probabilistic recognition rules. For games with oligarchic voting rules (a class that includes unanimity rule), we establish conditions on individual utilities that ensure that for almost all discount factors, the number of SSP equilibria is odd and the equilibrium correspondence lower-hemicontinuous. For games with general, monotonic voting rules, we show generic (in discount factors) determinacy of SSP equilibria under the restriction that the agreement space is of dimension one. For non-oligarchic voting rules and agreement spaces of higher finite dimension, we establish generic determinacy for the subset of SSP equilibria in pure strategies. The analysis also extends to the case of fixed delay costs. Lastly, we provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness of SSP equilibrium in oligarchic games. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006
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Volume (Year): 28 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
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