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Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy

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  • David Baron
  • Alexander Hirsch

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  • David Baron & Alexander Hirsch, 2012. "Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 639-681, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:639-681
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0628-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Helpman Elhanan & Persson Torsten, 2001. "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-33, November.
    2. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
    3. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 309-329, June.
    4. Dekel, Eddie & Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 2009. "Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 4(2), pages 103-128, July.
    5. Guillaume Fréchette & John Kagel & Massimo Morelli, 2012. "Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 779-800, April.
    6. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967.
    7. Marc Debus, 2009. "Pre-electoral commitments and government formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 45-64, January.
    8. Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002. "Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 893-907, May.
    9. Daniel Seidmann & Eyal Winter & Elan Pavlov, 2007. "The Formateurs’ Role in Government Formation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(3), pages 427-445, June.
    10. David P. Baron, 2006. "Competitive Lobbying and Supermajorities in a Majority‐rule Institution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 607-642, December.
    11. Groseclose, Tim & Snyder, James M., 1996. "Buying Supermajorities," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(2), pages 303-315, June.
    12. Golder, Sona Nadenichek, 2006. "Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 193-212, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Squintani, 2012. "Introduction to the symposium in political economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 513-519, April.
    2. Francesco Di Comite & Thomas Lambert, 2020. "Reforming Finance Under Fragmented Governments," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 62(1), pages 105-148, March.
    3. David P Baron, 2019. "Lobbying dynamics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 403-452, July.
    4. R. Aytimur, 2014. "Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 203-219, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lobbying; Public policy; Proto-coalitions; Common agency; Gridlock; D72; H11;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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