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Interest-group size and legislative lobbying

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  • Schneider, Maik T.

Abstract

We develop a model of legislative decision making in which lobbying and public policy are jointly determined. We examine how policy outcomes depend on the sizes of the interest groups. While a larger size typically involves favorable effects on policy, we also identify threshold levels of interest-group size where a lobby will be harmed if it becomes larger. This may provide another rationale as to why some interests do not or not fully organize. Spending limits can remove adverse policy effects of interest-group size. However, this is not necessarily welfare improving. Moreover, we find that endogenous proposal making may turn a second-mover advantage in standard legislative lobbying models into a second-mover disadvantage.

Suggested Citation

  • Schneider, Maik T., 2014. "Interest-group size and legislative lobbying," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 29-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:106:y:2014:i:c:p:29-41
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.05.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fehrler, Sebastian & Schneider, Maik T., 2021. "Buying supermajorities in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 113-154.
    2. Maik Schneider, 2018. "Buying Supermajorities in the Lab," Department of Economics Working Papers 68/18, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    3. Dellis, Arnaud, 2023. "Legislative informational lobbying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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