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Influencing Connected Legislators

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Battaglini
  • Eleonora Patacchini

Abstract

This paper studies how interest groups allocate campaign contributions when congressmen are connected by social ties. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the contribution game and characterize the associated allocation of the interest groups’ moneys. While the allocations are generally complex functions of the environment (the voting function, the legislators’ preferences, and the social network topology), they are simple, monotonically increasing functions of the respective legislators’ Katz-Bonacich centralities. Using data on the 109th–113th Congresses and on congressmen’s alumni connections, we estimate the model and find evidence supporting its predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Battaglini & Eleonora Patacchini, 2018. "Influencing Connected Legislators," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(6), pages 2277-2322.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/700074
    DOI: 10.1086/700074
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Battaglini & Eleonora Patacchini & Edoardo Rainone, 2019. "Endogenous Social Connections in Legislatures," NBER Working Papers 25988, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Matter, Ulrich & Roberti, Paolo & Slotwinski, Michaela, 2019. "Vote buying in the US Congress," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-052, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Marco Battaglini & Forrest W. Crawford & Eleonora Patacchini & Sida Peng, 2020. "A Graphical Lasso Approach to Estimating Network Connections: The Case of U.S. Lawmakers," NBER Working Papers 27557, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Lucas Braga de Melo & Valdemar Pinho Neto, 2026. "The Economic Returns of Firms’ Political Connections," Discussion Papers 175, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    5. Arnab K. Basu & Nancy H. Chau & Anustup Kundu & Kunal Sen, 2024. "Dishonesty concessions in teams: Theory and experimental insights from local politicians in India," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2024-87, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    6. Tiziano Arduini & Alberto Bisin & Onur Özgür & Eleonora Patacchini, 2019. "Dynamic Social Interactions and Health Risk Behavior," NBER Working Papers 26223, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. repec:osf:socarx:efnrq_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Tiziano Arduini & Edoardo Rainone, 2024. "Partial identification of treatment response under complementarity and substitutability," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1473, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    9. Demange, Gabrielle, 2017. "Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 84-103.
    10. Li, Xuan & Wang, Yanchen, 2024. "The effect of political connections on the distribution of firm performance," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    11. Das Chaudhury, Ratul & Leister, C. Matthew & Rai, Birendra, 2023. "Influencing a polarized and connected legislature," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 833-850.
    12. Díaz, Carlos & Patacchini, Eleonora & Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2021. "Leaders in juvenile crime," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 192(C), pages 638-667.
    13. Dellis, Arnaud, 2023. "Legislative informational lobbying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    14. Nikolaj Harmon & Raymond Fisman & Emir Kamenica, 2018. "Peer Effects in Legislative Voting," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series dp-304, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    15. Harkins, Andrew, 2020. "Network Comparative Statics," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1306, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    16. Harkins, Andrew, 2020. "Network Comparative Statics," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 64, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    17. Nikolaj Harmon & Raymond Fisman & Emir Kamenica, 2019. "Peer Effects in Legislative Voting," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 156-180, October.
    18. Garro, Haritz, 2020. "The Role of Connections in Congressional Lawmaking," SocArXiv efnrq, Center for Open Science.
    19. Andrea Cintolesi, 2024. "‘Keep friends close, but enemies closer’: connections and political careers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 257-284, July.
    20. Nathan Canen & Shantanu Chadha, 2026. "Empirical Challenges with Peers-of-Peers Instruments in the Linear-In-Means Model," Papers 2602.24215, arXiv.org.
    21. Battaglini, Marco & Leone Sciabolazza, Valerio & Patacchini, Eleonora, 2020. "Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress," CEPR Discussion Papers 15270, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    22. Prummer, Anja, 2020. "Micro-targeting and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    23. Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric, 2019. "Group targeting under networked synergies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 29-46.
    24. Patacchini, Eleonora & Hsieh, Chih-Sheng & Lin, Xu, 2019. "Social Interaction Methods," CEPR Discussion Papers 14141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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