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Group targeting under networked synergies

Author

Listed:
  • Mohamed Belhaj

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, ECM - École Centrale de Marseille)

  • Frédéric Deroïan

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We consider bilateral public contracts à la Segal (1999). The paper shows that the synergies between contracting and non-contracting agents deeply impact optimal contracts: they can lead the principal to contract with a subset of the agents, and to refrain from contracting with central agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroïan, 2019. "Group targeting under networked synergies," Post-Print hal-02452272, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02452272
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.003
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-02452272v1
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    Cited by:

    1. Margherita Comola & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Marie Claire Villeval, 2024. "Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting [En compétition pour l'influence dans les réseaux grâce au ciblage stratégique]," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-04706311, HAL.
    2. Thomas J. Sargent & John Stachurski, 2022. "Economic Networks: Theory and Computation," Papers 2203.11972, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
    3. Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroïan & Shahir Safi, 2020. "Costly agreement-based transfers and targeting on networks with synergies," AMSE Working Papers 2015, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    4. Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric & Safi, Shahir, 2023. "Targeting in networks under costly agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 154-172.
    5. Chukwudi Henry Dike, 2020. "Strategic Interactions in Financial Networks," 2020 Papers pdi579, Job Market Papers.
    6. Allouch, Nizar & King, Maia, 2021. "Welfare targeting in networks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    7. Mohanty, Sambit & Rao, K.S. Mallikarjuna & Roy, Jaideep, 2024. "Kantian imperatives in public goods networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 194-214.
    8. Sun, Yang & Zhao, Wei, 2024. "Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 285-311.
    9. Li, Jian & Zhou, Junjie & Chen, Ying-Ju, 2021. "The Limit of Targeting in Networks," ISU General Staff Papers 202112081957590000, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    10. Francis Bloch & Shaden Shabayek, 2023. "Targeting in social networks with anonymized information," Post-Print halshs-04208539, HAL.
    11. Bloch, Francis & Shabayek, Shaden, 2023. "Targeting in social networks with anonymized information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 380-402.
    12. Yifan Xiong & Youze Lang & Ziyan Li, 2024. "Cost intervention in delinquent networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 62(2), pages 321-344, March.
    13. Li, Jian & Zhou, Junjie & Chen, Ying-Ju, 2022. "The limit of targeting in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    14. Hiller, Timo, 2025. "Targeting in adaptive networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    15. Dike Chukwudi Henry, 2021. "Network Games, Peer Effect and Neutral Transfers," Studies in Economics 2107, School of Economics, University of Kent.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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