Vote Buying: General Elections
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DOI: 10.1086/587624
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- Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinksy, 2006. "Vote Bying I: General Elections," Discussion Papers 1434, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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