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Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems

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  • Roger B. Myerson

Abstract

A simple model is used to compare, under different electoral systems, the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters, by making campaign promises that favor small groups, rather than appealing equally to all voters. In this game model, each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate, subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1. Symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two-candidate elections, and for multicandidate elections under rank-scoring rules, approval voting, and single transferable vote. Voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate, in this model, the most severely unequal campaign promises.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger B. Myerson, 1992. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems," Discussion Papers 1000, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1000
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Simon, Leo K & Zame, William R, 1990. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 861-872.
    2. Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:01:p:102-114_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Reed, Steven R., 1990. "Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, pages 335-356.
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    Cited by:

    1. Spiegler, Ran, 2006. "Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, pages 207-231.
    2. Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2004. "Vote Buying," Discussion Papers 1386, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
      • Jackson, Matthew O. & Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2005. "Vote buying," Working Papers 1215, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
      • Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2005. "Vote Buying," Others 0503006, EconWPA.
    3. Dutta, Jayasri & Morris, Stephen, 1997. "The Revelation of Information and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 231-244.
    4. Jennifer Merolla & Michael Munger & Michael Tofias, 2005. "In Play: A Commentary on Strategies in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 19-37, April.
    5. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 118-149.
    6. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2006. "Pork Barrel Cycles," NBER Working Papers 12190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Klarita Gërxhani & Arthur Schram, 2004. "Albanian Political-Economics: Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture," Development and Comp Systems 0404009, EconWPA.
    8. Myerson, Roger B., 2002. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 219-251.
    9. Daron Acemoglu & Pol Antràs & Elhanan Helpman, 2005. "Contracts and the Division of Labor," NBER Working Papers 11356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Baqir, Reza, 1999. "Districts, spillovers, and government overspending," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2192, The World Bank.
    11. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2005. "Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2075, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    12. Dhammika Dharmapala, 2002. "Legislative Bargaining and Incremental Budgeting," Working papers 2002-10, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    13. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 225-239.
    14. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 225-239.

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