IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection

  • Guilherme Carmona

    (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)

  • José Fajardo

    (IBMEC Business School - Rio de Janeiro)

We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be sufficient to analyze common agency problems. In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Economics Research Group, IBMEC Business School - Rio de Janeiro in its series IBMEC RJ Economics Discussion Papers with number 2006-05.

in new window

Date of creation: 24 Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ibr:dpaper:2006-05
Contact details of provider: Postal: Av. Pres. Wilson 118, 11 andar, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil, 20030-020
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
  2. David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
  3. Frank H. Page & Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 2002. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," Game Theory and Information 0204001, EconWPA.
  4. Leo K. Simon and William R. Zame., 1987. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Economics Working Papers 8756, University of California at Berkeley.
  5. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-72, September.
  6. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 1999. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," IDEI Working Papers 110, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003.
  7. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition," MPRA Paper 6992, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March.
  9. Paulo Monteiro & Frank Page, 2008. "Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 503-524, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ibr:dpaper:2006-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Márcio Laurini)

The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Márcio Laurini to update the entry or send us the correct address

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.