IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Delegation Principle for Multi-agency Games under Ex Post Equilibrium

Listed author(s):
  • Yu Chen

    ()

    (Nanjing University)

  • Zhenhua Wu

    ()

    (Nanjing University)

Registered author(s):

    We explore the strategic equivalence of the delegated menu contracting procedure in pure-strategy multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium. Our model setup permits "full-blown interdependence," including information externality, contract externality, correlated types, and primitive constraints across the contracts for different agents. Our delegation principle identifies that (optimal) ex post menu design is strategically equivalent to (optimal) bilateral ex post mechanism design, which simplifies collective ex post mechanism design by ignoring relative information evaluation. Moreover, one can restrict attention to product menu design problems out of general menu design problems if the contract constraint sets have product structures. Our results still hold if we include individual rationality or any degenerated form of "full-blown interdependence."

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.iub.edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/2012/CAEPR2012-008.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington in its series Caepr Working Papers with number 2012-008.

    as
    in new window

    Length: 26 pages
    Date of creation: Nov 2012
    Handle: RePEc:inu:caeprp:2012008
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    812-855-1021

    Phone: 812-855-1021
    Fax: 812-855-3736
    Web page: http://www.iub.edu/~caepr
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as
    in new window


    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2011. "Robust implementation in general mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-281, March.
    2. Page, Frank H, Jr, 1992. "Mechanism Design for General Screening Problems with Moral Hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(2), pages 265-281, April.
    3. Vianney Dequiedt & David Martimort, 2007. "Mechanism Design with Private Communication," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 843644000000000074, www.najecon.org.
    4. Carlier, Guillaume, 2001. "A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 129-150, February.
    5. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2006. "The Limits of ex post Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 585-610, 05.
    6. Page, Frank Jr. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 2003. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 63-109, February.
    7. Giammarino, Ronald M & Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1993. " An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1523-1542, September.
    8. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2008. "Ex post implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 527-566, July.
    9. Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2002. "Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 1339, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Ehud Kalai, 2004. "Large Robust Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November.
    11. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-1372, September.
    12. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
    13. Carmona, Guilherme & Fajardo, José, 2009. "Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 749-760, July.
    14. Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterji & Ron Lavi & Ahuva Mu'alem & Noam Nisan & Arunava Sen, 2006. "Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(4), pages 1109-1132, 07.
    15. Peter J. Hammond, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 263-282.
    16. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2006. "Ex post implementation in environments with private goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 369-393, September.
    17. Han, Seungjin, 2006. "Menu theorems for bilateral contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 157-178, November.
    18. Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-005, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jan 2013.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inu:caeprp:2012008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.