Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation
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- Page Junior, Frank H. & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2002.
"Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing,"
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- Page, Frank Jr. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 2003. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 63-109, February.
- Page, F.H.Jr. & Monteiro, P.K., 2001. "Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 592, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Frank H. Page & Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 2002. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," Game Theory and Information 0204001, EconWPA.
- Page, Frank Jr., 1987. "The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 157-167, April.
- Peters, Michael, 2001.
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- Page, Frank H, Jr, 1992. "Mechanism Design for General Screening Problems with Moral Hazard," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 265-81, April.
- Han, Seungjin, 2006.
"Menu theorems for bilateral contracting,"
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- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002.
"The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 575, CESifo Group Munich.
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