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On multiple agent models of moral hazard


  • Andrea Attar

    (IDEI, Toulouse)

  • Eloisa Campioni

    (LUISS, University of Rome)

  • Gwena�l Piaser

    () (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca� Foscari)

  • Uday Rajan

    (Ross School of Business, University of Michigan)


In multiple principal, multiple agent models of moral hazard, we provide conditions under which the outcomes of equilibria in direct mechanisms are preserved when principals can offer indirect communication schemes. We discuss the role of random allocations and recommendations and relate the result to the existing literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwena�l Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2006. "On multiple agent models of moral hazard," Working Papers 2006_32, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  • Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_32

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-1372, September.
    2. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
    3. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
    4. Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 333-337, June.
    5. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.

    More about this item


    Moral Hazard; Multiple Agents; Direct Mechanism.;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design


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