IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ven/wpaper/2006_32.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On multiple agent models of moral hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Andrea Attar

    (IDEI, Toulouse)

  • Eloisa Campioni

    (LUISS, University of Rome)

  • Gwena�l Piaser

    (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca� Foscari)

  • Uday Rajan

    (Ross School of Business, University of Michigan)

Abstract

In multiple principal, multiple agent models of moral hazard, we provide conditions under which the outcomes of equilibria in direct mechanisms are preserved when principals can offer indirect communication schemes. We discuss the role of random allocations and recommendations and relate the result to the existing literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwena�l Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2006. "On multiple agent models of moral hazard," Working Papers 2006_32, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    • Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_32
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.unive.it/pag/fileadmin/user_upload/dipartimenti/economia/doc/Pubblicazioni_scientifiche/working_papers/2006/WP_DSE_Piaser_32_06.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2006
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-1372, September.
    2. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
    3. Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 333-337, June.
    4. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    5. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
    6. Han, Seungjin, 2006. "Menu theorems for bilateral contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 157-178, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
    2. Han, Seungjin, 2007. "Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 610-626, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2012. "Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(4), pages 283-296, December.
    2. ATTAR, Andrea & CAMPIONI, Eloisa & PIASER, Gwenaël & RAJAN, Uday, 2004. "Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents : a comment," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Pavan, Alessandro, 2021. "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," TSE Working Papers 21-1227, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Dec 2023.
    4. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2018. "On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 1-15.
    5. Martimort David & Stole Lars, 2003. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-40, July.
    6. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2013. "Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 62-70.
    7. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle," CEIS Research Paper 201, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 30 Jun 2011.
    8. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Private communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 258-283.
    9. Seungjin Han, 2021. "Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism Games," Papers 2109.13177, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    10. Han, Seungjin, 2014. "Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 85-95.
    11. Ghosh, Sambuddha & Han, Seungjin, 2012. "Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets," Microeconomics.ca working papers seungjin_han-2012-12, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 May 2013.
    12. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2021. "Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 79-93.
    13. Pavan, Alessandro & Calzolari, Giacomo, 2009. "Sequential contracting with multiple principals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 503-531, March.
    14. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
    15. Ales, Laurence & Maziero, Pricila, 2016. "Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 362-395.
    16. Hernández-Murillo, Rubén, 2019. "Interjurisdictional competition with adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 85-95.
    17. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Interactive Information Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 153-175, February.
    18. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars A., 2018. "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), September.
    19. Han, Seungjin, 2007. "Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 610-626, November.
    20. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-049 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1027-1046, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral Hazard; Multiple Agents; Direct Mechanism.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_32. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Geraldine Ludbrook (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dsvenit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.