A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
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- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2018. "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," Post-Print halshs-01885428, HAL.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2018. "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01885428, HAL.
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Cited by:
- Didier Laussel & Joana Resende, 2020.
"Complementary Monopolies with asymmetric information,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(4), pages 943-981, November.
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- Didier Laussel & Joana Resende, 2018. "Complementary Monopolies with Asymmetric Information," AMSE Working Papers 1842, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
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More about this item
Keywords
Intrinsic common agency; aggregate games; mechanism design for delegated decision-making; duality; equilibrium selection;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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