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Multi-Principaux avec Anti-Sélection

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  • Martimort, David

Abstract

This article departs from the classical Incentive Theory and his Grand Contrat approach by allowing a common agent to contract with multiple principals, each one controlling one agent's activity through a non linear tarification. In this framework, the Revelation Principle has to be replaced by a weaker concept: an Equivalence Principle. We derive the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the offers' game and we compare them to the cooperative solution. Results are shown to depend on the complementarity or the substituability between activities controlled by each principal.
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Suggested Citation

  • Martimort, David, 1992. "Multi-Principaux avec Anti-Sélection," IDEI Working Papers 14, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:4546
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
    2. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2016. "A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games," Working Papers 1618E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    2. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 456-481, April.
    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Pouyet, Jerome, 2004. "The subsidiarity bias in regulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 255-283, January.
    4. Estache, Antonio & Martimort, David, 1999. "Politics, transaction costs, and the design of regulatory institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2073, The World Bank.
    5. Calzolari, Giacomo & Pavan, Alessandro, 2006. "On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 168-204, September.
    6. Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti, 2005. "Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 615-649.
    7. Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2011. "Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(6), pages 1869-1918, November.
    8. d'Aspremont, Claude & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2010. "Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 21-33, September.
    9. Kai-Uwe Kuhn, 1997. "Nonlinear Pricing in Vertically Related Duopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 37-62, Spring.
    10. F. Barigozzi & N. Burani, 2016. "Competition Between For-Profit and Non-Profit Firms: Incentives, Workers’ Self-Selection, and Wage Differentials," Working Papers wp1072, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    11. Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton & Claude Jessua, 1996. "La théorie de l'agence commune en information complète," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(3), pages 447-455.
    12. Florence TOUYA, 2013. "Tax Interactions with Asymmetric Information and Nonlinear Instruments," Working Papers 2012-2013_9, CATT - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, revised Jul 2013.
    13. Khalil, Fahad & Martimort, David & Parigi, Bruno, 2007. "Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 35-67, July.
    14. Antoine Faure-Grimaud, 1997. "The Regulation of Predatory Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 425-451, June.
    15. Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik, 2011. "Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 887-924, September.
    16. Florence Lachet-Touya, 2012. "Les interactions fiscales verticales à la lumière de la théorie des multiprincipaux," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 78(1), pages 27-46.
    17. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2015. "A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games," MPRA Paper 66620, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Martimort, David & Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, 2004. "Common agency with informed principals," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 551, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    19. S. Lael Brainard & David Martimort, 1996. "Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 81-105.
    20. Florence TOUYA, 2009. "Tax Interactions with Asymmetric Information and Nonlinear Instruments," Working Papers 9, CATT - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, revised Nov 2009.
    21. Chiesa, Gabriella & Denicolò, Vincenzo, 2009. "Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 296-311, January.

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