Common agency with risk-averse agent
In a common agency model with a risk-averse agent and private information distortion in the equilibrium policy from the first-best is greater compared to the case of a risk-neutral agent. The principals are unable to screen completely the agent's preferences if he is sufficiently risk-averse: there is bunching in the contract. The contribution schedules keep track of informational externality. However, when the coefficient of risk-aversion goes to zero the contributions become truthful as in the complete information case.
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