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Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Attar, Andrea
  • Majumdar, Dipjyoti
  • Piaser, Gwenaël
  • Porteiro, Nicolás

Abstract

This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the Revelation Principle to hold when finite games with generic payoffs are considered. The result goes through without imposing any restriction on the principals' payoffs. This provides a rationale for the restriction to direct mechanisms even when competition among principals is considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Attar, Andrea & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Piaser, Gwenaël & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2008. "Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 75-95, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:1:p:75-95
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Seungjin Han, 2021. "Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism Games," Papers 2109.13177, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    3. Clark Bowman & Jonathan Hodge & Ada Yu, 2014. "The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 111-124, June.
    4. Han, Seungjin, 2012. "On take it or leave it offers in common agency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 777-781.
    5. Alessandro Pavan & Giacomo Calzolari, 2010. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 132-190, May.
    6. Hernández-Murillo, Rubén, 2019. "Interjurisdictional competition with adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 85-95.
    7. Guillem Roig, 2022. "The value of investment in nonexclusive contracts," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(3), pages 1018-1037, July.
    8. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-049 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4717 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Aadhaar Chaturvedi, 2023. "Contracting with multiple suppliers: A multi‐item buyer's make versus buy decision," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(2), pages 434-448, February.
    11. Gwenaël Piaser, 2014. "Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games," Working Papers 2014-49, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.

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