A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard
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- Attar, Andrea & Piaser, Gwenael & Porteiro, Nicolas, 2007. "A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 278-284, May.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Attar, Andrea & Chassagnon, Arnold, 2009.
"On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 511-525, September.
- Andrea Attar & Arnold Chassagnon, 2006. "On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts," Working Papers halshs-00589101, HAL.
- Andrea Attar & Arnold Chassagnon, 2009. "On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts," Post-Print halshs-00754338, HAL.
- Andrea Attar & Arnold Chassagnon, 2009. "On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754338, HAL.
- Andrea Attar & Arnold Chassagnon, 2006. "On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00589101, HAL.
- Roger, Guillaume, 2016. "Participation in moral hazard problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 10-24.
- Christos Bilanakos, 2011. "Optimal Contracts and Investment in General Human Capital under Common Agency," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 08-2011, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Attar, Andrea & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Piaser, Gwenaël & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2008. "Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 75-95, July.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/4717 is not listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
Menus; Common Agency.;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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