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Dipjyoti Majumdar

Personal Details

First Name:Dipjyoti
Middle Name:
Last Name:Majumdar
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pma1613
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree:2000 Indian Statistical Institute (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Concordia University

Montréal, Canada
https://www.concordia.ca/artsci/economics.html
RePEc:edi:deconca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Artyom Shneyerov & Huan Xie, 2010. "How Optimism Leads to Price Discovery and Efficiency in a Dynamic Matching Market," Working Papers 10004, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
  2. ATTAR, Andrea & MAJUMDAR, Dipjyoti & PIASER, Gwenaêl & PORTEIRO, Nicolàs, 2003. "Common agency games with separable preferences," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003102, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching," Working Papers hal-00242988, HAL.

    repec:ind:isipdp:03-01 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2010. "A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(5), pages 979-1002, October.
  2. Attar, Andrea & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Piaser, Gwenaël & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2008. "Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 75-95, July.
  3. Majumdar, Dipjyoti, 2004. "An axiomatic characterization of Bayes' Rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 261-273, May.
  4. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 523-540, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. ATTAR, Andrea & MAJUMDAR, Dipjyoti & PIASER, Gwenaêl & PORTEIRO, Nicolàs, 2003. "Common agency games with separable preferences," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003102, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    Cited by:

    1. Han, Seungjin, 2011. "On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency," Microeconomics.ca working papers seungjin_han-2011-11, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 30 Aug 2012.
    2. Gwena�l Piaser, 2006. "The Biais-Martimort-Rochet equilibrium with direct mechanisms," Working Papers 2006_33, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    3. Gwenael Piaser, 2005. "Stochastic and deterministic menus in common agency games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(11), pages 1-6.
    4. Han, Seungjin, 2007. "Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 610-626, November.

  2. Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching," Working Papers hal-00242988, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Debasis Mishra, 2016. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains," Discussion Papers 16-02, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    2. Debasis Mishra, 2014. "A Foundation for Dominant Strategy Voting Mechanisms," ISER Discussion Paper 0916, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    3. Ehlers, Lars & Massó, Jordi, 2015. "Matching markets under (in)complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 295-314.
    4. Joana Pais, 2006. "Random Matching in the College Admissions Problem," Working Papers Department of Economics 2006/13, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.
    5. Ehlers, Lars & Masso, Jordi, 2007. "Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 587-600, September.
    6. Pais, Joana, 2008. "Incentives in decentralized random matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 632-649, November.
    7. M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 120-141, November.
    8. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2017. "Stability with one-sided incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 372-399.

Articles

  1. Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2010. "A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(5), pages 979-1002, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Degan, Arianna & Li, Ming, 2015. "Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 242-259.
    2. Elena Panova, 2011. "A Passion for Democracy," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-47, CIRANO.
    3. Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, 2014. "Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 4988, CESifo.
    4. Conrad, Peter & Bergey, Meredith R., 2014. "The impending globalization of ADHD: Notes on the expansion and growth of a medicalized disorder," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 31-43.
    5. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2014. "Behavioral public choice: A survey," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/03, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2016. "Whither Game Theory?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001307, David K. Levine.

  2. Attar, Andrea & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Piaser, Gwenaël & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2008. "Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 75-95, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Attar, Andrea & Chassagnon, Arnold, 2009. "On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 511-525, September.
    2. Clark Bowman & Jonathan Hodge & Ada Yu, 2014. "The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 111-124, June.
    3. Han, Seungjin, 2011. "On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency," Microeconomics.ca working papers seungjin_han-2011-11, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 30 Aug 2012.
    4. Ruben Hernandez-Murillo, 2012. "Interjurisdictional competition with adverse selection," Working Papers 2012-052, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    5. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games," Discussion Papers 1458, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Seungjin Han, 2021. "Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism Games," Department of Economics Working Papers 2021-07, McMaster University.
    7. Guillem Roig, 2022. "The value of investment in nonexclusive contracts," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(3), pages 1018-1037, July.
    8. Aadhaar Chaturvedi, 2023. "Contracting with multiple suppliers: A multi‐item buyer's make versus buy decision," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(2), pages 434-448, February.
    9. Gwenaël Piaser, 2014. "Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games," Working Papers 2014-49, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.

  3. Majumdar, Dipjyoti, 2004. "An axiomatic characterization of Bayes' Rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 261-273, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Andrés Perea, 2009. "A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 163-222, August.
    2. Brandts, J. & Riedl, A.M. & van Winden, F., 2005. "Competition and well-being," Research Memorandum 034, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Hinojosa Ramos, Miguel Ángel & López Sánchez, Ana Dolores, 2011. "Regla de reparto proporcional con referencias múltiples: aplicación al caso de agregación y actualización de probabilidades || A Proportional Rule for the Division Problems with Multiple References: A," Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa = Journal of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, vol. 12(1), pages 65-80, December.
    4. Biung-Ghi Ju & Eiichi Miyagawa & Toyotaka Sakai, 2003. "Non-Manipulable Division Rules in Claim Problems and Generalizations," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200307, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2005.

  4. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 523-540, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Semin Kim, 2016. "Incentive Compatibility On The Domain Of Singlepeaked Preferences," Working papers 2016rwp-96, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    2. Eduardo M. Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2017. "Strategy-proofness in the Large," NBER Working Papers 23771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó, 2004. "Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 637.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. Debasis Mishra, 2016. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains," Discussion Papers 16-02, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    5. Debasis Mishra & Xu Lang, 2022. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Discussion Papers 22-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    6. Nunez, Matias, 2007. "A note on Minimal Unanimity and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 209-211, March.
    7. Debasis Mishra, 2014. "A Foundation for Dominant Strategy Voting Mechanisms," ISER Discussion Paper 0916, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    8. Ehlers, Lars & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava, 2020. "Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 31-41.
    9. Ehlers, Lars & Massó, Jordi, 2015. "Matching markets under (in)complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 295-314.
    10. Semin Kim, 2016. "Ordinal Versus Cardinal Voting Rules: A Mechanism Design Approach," Working papers 2016rwp-94, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    11. Karmokar, Madhuparna & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules," MPRA Paper 103494, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Lars EHLERS & Dipjyoti MAJUMDAR & Debasis MISHRA & Arunava SEN, 2016. "Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms," Cahiers de recherche 04-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    13. Yasunori Okumura, 2021. "Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 117-145, February.
    14. Joana Pais, 2006. "Random Matching in the College Admissions Problem," Working Papers Department of Economics 2006/13, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.
    15. Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2022. "On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    16. Lars EHLERS & Jordi MASSO, 2018. "Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets : A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance," Cahiers de recherche 04-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    17. Ehlers, Lars & Masso, Jordi, 2007. "Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 587-600, September.
    18. Pais, Joana, 2008. "Incentives in decentralized random matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 632-649, November.
    19. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies," Working Papers 2010-2, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    20. Yaron Azrieli & Semin Kim, 2014. "Pareto Efficiency And Weighted Majority Rules," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1067-1088, November.
    21. Sulagna Dasgupta & Debasis Mishra, 2020. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model," Papers 2009.13104, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    22. Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Roy, Souvik, 2021. "Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 11-27.
    23. Bose, Abhigyan & Roy, Souvik, 2023. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive-compatible voting rules with correlated belief under betweenness property," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    24. Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2023. "A General Impossibility Theorem on Pareto Efficiency and Bayesian Incentive Compatibility," Papers 2303.05968, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    25. Miguel Ballester & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2009. "Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 477-494, September.
    26. Kim, Semin, 2017. "Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: A mechanism design approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 350-371.
    27. Bhargava, Mohit & , & ,, 2015. "Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
    28. Madhuparna Karmokar & Souvik Roy, 2023. "The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(1), pages 111-152, July.
    29. Lang, Xu & Mishra, Debasis, 2024. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
    30. EHLERS, Lars & MAJUMDAR, Dipjyoti & MISHRA, Debasis & SEN, Arunava, 2016. "Continuity and incentive compatibility," Cahiers de recherche 2016-04, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    31. Miho Hong & Semin Kim, 2018. "Unanimity and Local Incentive Compatibility," Working papers 2018rwp-138, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    32. Xu Lang & Debasis Mishra, 2022. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Papers 2207.09253, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (2) 2010-11-06 2010-11-20
  2. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (2) 2010-11-06 2010-11-20
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2005-02-06 2010-11-20
  4. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2004-01-08
  5. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2005-02-06

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