A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
Implementation in iteratively undominated strategies relies on permissive conditions. However, for the sufficiency results available, authors have relied on assumptions that amount to quasilinear preferences on a numeraire. We uncover a new necessary condition that implies that such assumptions cannot be dispensed with. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation are more restrictive than previously thought.
|Date of creation:||20 Jan 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Economic Theory 146 (6), November 2011: 2583–2595|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Veláquez 76, 28001 Madrid|
Web page: http://www.cienciassociales.imdea.org/
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- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007.
"Robust Virtual Implementation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1609R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2009.
- Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007.
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2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine," Working Papers 2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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