A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies
Implementation in iteratively undominated strategies relies on permissive conditions. However, for the sufficiency results available, authors have relied on assumptions that amount to quasilinear preferences on a numeraire. We uncover a new necessary condition that implies that such assumptions cannot be dispensed with. We term the condition “restricted deceptionproofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation are more restrictive than previously thought.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007.
"Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine,"
2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Working Papers 2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2009.
"Robust virtual implementation,"
Econometric Society, vol. 4(1), March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Virtual Implementation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000155, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1609R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2009.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2010-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Brown Economics Webmaster)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.