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Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction

  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Stephen Morris

This essay is the introduction for a collection of papers by the two of us on "Robust Mechanism Design" to be published by World Scientific Publishing. The appendix of this essay lists the chapters of the book. The objective of this introductory essay is to provide the reader with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers. The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, the single unit auction with interdependent values. In addition, we include an extended discussion about the role of alternative assumptions about type spaces in our work and the literature, in order to explain the common logic of the informational robustness approach that unifies the work in this volume.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 786969000000000187.

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Date of creation: 19 Aug 2011
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000187
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  1. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Working Papers 2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  2. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2006. "On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 213-233, 01.
  3. Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm387, Yale School of Management.
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
  5. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Tercieux, Olivier, 2011. "Rationalizable implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 1253-1274, May.
  6. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
  7. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000001000, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Michael Peters, 2001. "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 613-631.
  9. Jeff Ely, 2003. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000064, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Morris, Stephen, 2011. "The robustness of robust implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2093-2104, September.
  11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 309-342, March.
  12. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
  13. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1772R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 2011.
  14. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November.
  15. Gizatulina, Alia & Hellwig, Martin, 2010. "Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2260-2281, November.
  16. Neeman, Z., 1998. "The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design," Papers 93, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  17. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Ascending Auction: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000845, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. Borgers, Tilman & Smith, Doug, 2011. "Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules," MPRA Paper 37027, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Marion Oury & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Continuous Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1605-1637, 07.
  20. Felix Bierbrauer & Martin Hellwig, 2011. "Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  21. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design," Working Papers 2010-05, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  22. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
  23. Chen, Yi-Chun & Xiong, Siyang, 2011. "The genericity of beliefs-determine-preferences models revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 751-761, March.
  24. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 857-871, 05.
  25. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2008. "Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 469-490, December.
  26. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "All equilibria of the Vickrey auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 170-177, January.
  27. Peter Cramton & Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg, 2004. "Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 04mit, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004.
  28. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-42, November.
  29. Plum, M, 1992. "Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(4), pages 393-418.
  30. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1313, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  31. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
  32. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
  33. Dirk Bergemann & Karl H. Schlag, 2007. "Pricing without Priors," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1625, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  34. Ledyard, John O., 1978. "Incentive compatibility and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 171-189, June.
  35. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
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