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Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction

  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Stephen Morris

This essay is the introduction for a collection of papers by the two of us on "Robust Mechanism Design" to be published by World Scientific Publishing. The appendix of this essay lists the chapters of the book. The objective of this introductory essay is to provide the reader with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers. The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, the single unit auction with interdependent values. In addition, we include an extended discussion about the role of alternative assumptions about type spaces in our work and the literature, in order to explain the common logic of the informational robustness approach that unifies the work in this volume.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 786969000000000187.

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Date of creation: 19 Aug 2011
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000187
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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2010. "Rationalizable Implementation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000022, David K. Levine.
  2. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
  3. Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2004. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 169, Econometric Society.
  4. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
  5. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "All equilibria of the Vickrey auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 170-177, January.
  6. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 857-871, 05.
  7. Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1423, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Dirk Bergemann & Karl H. Schlag, 2007. "Pricing without Priors," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1625, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine," Working Papers 2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  10. Börgers, Tilman & Smith, Doug, 2014. "Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
  11. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1313, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Peter Cramton & Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg, 2004. "Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 04mit, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004.
  13. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
  14. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1772, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  15. Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2007. "An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 125-130, May.
  16. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org.
  17. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Ascending Auction: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000845, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. Marion Oury & Olivier Tercieux, 2009. "Continuous Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0090, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  19. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November.
  20. Michael Peters, 1997. "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Working Papers peters-97-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  21. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design," Working Papers 2010-05, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  22. Zvika Neeman, 1998. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers 0093, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  23. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 309-342, March.
  24. Chen, Yi-Chun & Xiong, Siyang, 2011. "The genericity of beliefs-determine-preferences models revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 751-761, March.
  25. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2004. "On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Discussion Paper Series dp350, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  26. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
  27. Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Morris, Stephen, 2011. "The robustness of robust implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2093-2104, September.
  28. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
  29. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2008. "Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 469-490, December.
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