IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/the/publsh/182.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

Author

Listed:
  • ,

    (University of California, Los Angeless)

Abstract

We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for environments with private goods, informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) are compatible with ex post equilibrium in the presence of multi-dimensional signals.

Suggested Citation

  • ,, 2006. "Ex post implementation in environments with private goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 369-393, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:182
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20060369/794/33
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 4, pages 153-194, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 1, pages 1-48, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2013. "Information concentration in common value environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 183-203, September.
    4. Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Stephen Morris, 2012. "The Robustness of Robust Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 10, pages 357-373, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Ex Post Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 3, pages 97-152, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo & Kojima, Fuhito, 2015. "Efficient assignment with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 54-86.
    7. Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 494-514, November.
    8. Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2012. "Locally robust implementation and its limits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2439-2452.
    9. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Fujinaka, Yuji & Miyakawa, Toshiji, 2020. "Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 157-164.
    11. Yu Chen & Zhenhua Wu, 2012. "Delegation Principle for Multi-agency Games under Ex Post Equilibrium," CAEPR Working Papers 2012-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    12. Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny & Zame, William R., 2007. "Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 70-73, October.
    13. Parikshit De & Manipushpak Mitra, 2017. "Incentives and justice for sequencing problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(2), pages 239-264, August.
    14. Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Müller, Rudolf, 2015. "Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 114-131.
    15. Tan, Xu, 2016. "Information revelation in auctions with common and private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 147-165.
    16. Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence reading mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 375-397, October.
    17. Alejandro Francetich, 2013. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner’s Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," Working Papers 501, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    18. Hashimoto, Tadashi, 2018. "The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 708-733.
    19. Debasis Mishra & Abdul Quadir, 2012. "Deterministic single object auctions with private values," Discussion Papers 12-06, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    20. Dizdar, Deniz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2016. "On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 106-123.
    21. M. Yenmez, 2015. "Incentive compatible market design with applications," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 543-569, August.
    22. Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
    23. Baisa, Brian, 2020. "Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
    24. repec:inu:caeprp:2012-008 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Alejandro Francetich, 2015. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner's Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 45-76, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ex post incentive compatibility; multi-dimensional information; interdependent values;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:the:publsh:182. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Martin J. Osborne (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://econtheory.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.