Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction
In: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs
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- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000187, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1818, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Working Papers 1332, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
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Cited by:
- McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2025.
"Information requirements for mechanism design,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
- Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2024. "Information Requirements for Mechanism Design," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-035, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- EHLERS, Lars & MASSO, Jordi, 2018.
"Robust design in monotonic matching markets: A case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance,"
Cahiers de recherche
2018-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Lars EHLERS & Jordi MASSO, 2018. "Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets : A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance," Cahiers de recherche 04-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020. "Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge," CARF F-Series CARF-F-500, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022.
"Epistemological implementation of social choice functions,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2023.
"Continuous level-k mechanism design,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 481-501.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2021. "Continuous Level-k Mechanism Design," Working Papers 2021-002, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- , & Smith, Doug, 2014.
"Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
- Borgers, Tilman & Smith, Doug, 2011. "Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules," MPRA Paper 37027, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Unique Information Elicitation," CARF F-Series CARF-F-496, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
- Fabian Herweg & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2020.
"Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2194-2212, May.
- Schmidt, Klaus & Herweg, Fabian, 2017. "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," CEPR Discussion Papers 12385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2017. "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 47, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
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- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D0 - Microeconomics - - General
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