Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
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- Börgers, Tilman & Smith, Doug, 2014. "Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
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Cited by:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011.
"Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1818, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Working Papers 1332, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000187, David K. Levine.
- Felix J. Bierbrauer & Martin F. Hellwig, 2015. "Public-Good Provision, Mechanism Design and Voting," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Yildiz, Muhamet, 2015. "Invariance to representation of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 142-156.
- Penta, Antonio, 2015. "Robust dynamic implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 280-316.
- Mishra, Debasis, 2016. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 925-954.
- Felix J. Bierbrauer & Martin F. Hellwig, 2015. "Public-Good Provision in Large Economies," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- repec:spr:reecde:v:21:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-017-0201-0 is not listed on IDEAS
- Yamashita, Takuro, 2015. "Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 267-279.
More about this item
Keywords
robust mechanism design; dominant strategies; voting; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem;JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2012-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-03-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2012-03-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-03-08 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2012-03-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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