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Empirical strategy-proofness

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  • Rodrigo A. Velez
  • Alexander L. Brown

Abstract

We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2019, arXiv:1804.07986) we determine that this behavior is plausible only when the social choice function violates a non-bossiness condition and information is not interior. Analysis of the accumulated experimental and empirical evidence on these games supports our findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Rodrigo A. Velez & Alexander L. Brown, 2019. "Empirical strategy-proofness," Papers 1907.12408, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1907.12408
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander L. Brown & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2019. "Empirical bias and efficiency of alpha-auctions: experimental evidence," Papers 1905.03876, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
    2. Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2022. "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 902-941, June.
    3. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.

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