Understanding Overbidding In Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- David J. Cooper & Hanming Fang, 2006. "Understanding Overbidding in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1557, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Andreoni, James & Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2007.
"Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 240-259, May.
- James Andreoni & Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2005. "Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000474, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Andreoni,J. & Che,Y.-K. & Kim,J., 2006. "Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions : an experiment," Working papers 6, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- James Andreoni & Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2006. "Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000293, UCLA Department of Economics.
More about this item
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:118:y:2008:i:532:p:1572-1595. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.