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Behavioral Implementation

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Abstract

Implementation theory assumes that participantsí choices are rational,in the sense of being derived from the maximization of a contextindependent preference. The paper investigates implementation under complete information when the mechanism designer is aware that individuals suffer from cognitive biases that lead to violations of IIA, or cannot exclude the possibility of such ìirrationalî behavior.

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  • Geoffroy de Clippel, 2012. "Behavioral Implementation," Working Papers 2012-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2012-6
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