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A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents

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  • Glazer, Jacob
  • Rubinstein, Ariel

Abstract

A new model of mechanism design with a boundedly rational agent is studied. A speaker presents a request to a listener who would like to accept the request only if certain conditions are met by the speaker’s true profile. This persuasion situation is modeled as a leader-follower relationship. The listener first announces and commits to a persuasion rule, i.e., a set of conditions to be satisfied by the profile in order for him to be persuaded. Then, the speaker presents a profile, though not necessarily the true one. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and on the persuasion rule and the way in which it is framed. We fully characterize the circumstances under which the listener’s goal can be achieved.

Suggested Citation

  • Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2012. "A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275767, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275767
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275767
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. T. Hayashi & R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Behavioral strong implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1257-1287, November.
    2. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 102, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    3. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Thysen, Heidi C., 2021. "Strategic interpretations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    4. Joanna Franaszek, 2021. "When Competence Hurts: Revelation of Complex Information," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 5-23.
    5. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Thysen, Heidi C., 2021. "Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 109842, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2014. "Complex Questionnaires," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1529-1541, July.
    7. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Thysen, Heidi C., 2021. "Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    8. Koray, Semih & Yildiz, Kemal, 2018. "Implementation via rights structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 479-502.
    9. Kneeland, Terri, 2017. "Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-303, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    10. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2014. "Behavioral Implementation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 2975-3002, October.
    11. Ran Spiegler, 2023. "Behavioral Causal Inference," Papers 2305.18916, arXiv.org.
    12. Kneeland, Terri, 2022. "Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    13. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Rational attitude change by reference cues when information elaboration requires effort," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 90-107.
    14. Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes," Working Papers 2014-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    15. Penczynski, Stefan P., 2016. "Persuasion: An experimental study of team decision making," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 244-261.
    16. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.

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