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Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules

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  • Kimya, Mert

Abstract

I analyze Nash implementation when agents might use an exogenous tie-breaking rule to choose among the messages they are materially indifferent between. If the planner is endowed with the knowledge of the rule, this might expand or shrink the set of implementable social choice correspondences depending on the particular rule used by the agents. If the planner is not endowed with the knowledge of the rule, then the problem of implementation is almost equivalent to double implementation in Nash and strict Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:138-146
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.003
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash implementation; Behavioral mechanism design; Double implementation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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