Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
We deal with the implementation problem where agents in some groups can cooperate (or form coalitions) and in some others cannot. We consider a situation where the planner does not know whether agents in a group can cooperate or not. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a correspondence to be implementable in such a situation.
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Volume (Year): 14 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: 28 February 1995/Accepted: 13 March 1996|
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