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Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria

Author

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  • Sang-Chul Suh

    (Department of Economics, University of Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4, Canada)

Abstract

We deal with the implementation problem where agents in some groups can cooperate (or form coalitions) and in some others cannot. We consider a situation where the planner does not know whether agents in a group can cooperate or not. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a correspondence to be implementable in such a situation.

Suggested Citation

  • Sang-Chul Suh, 1997. "Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(3), pages 439-447.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:3:p:439-447
    Note: Received: 28 February 1995/Accepted: 13 March 1996
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Margarita Kirneva & Matias Nunez, 2021. "Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes," Working Papers 2021-08, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
    3. Yi, Jianxin, 2012. "Double implementation in Nash and M-Nash equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 105-107.
    4. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.
    5. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288, Elsevier.
    6. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.
    7. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
    8. M. Puy, 2013. "Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 65-87, January.
    9. Tian, Guoqiang, 2003. "A solution to the problem of consumption externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 831-847, November.
    10. Suh, Sang-Chul, 2001. "An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 103-110, January.
    11. Savva, Foivos, 2018. "Strong implementation with partially honest individuals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 27-34.

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