A solution to the problem of consumption externalities
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
- repec:eee:apmaco:v:265:y:2015:i:c:p:911-927 is not listed on IDEAS
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"Announcement or Contribution? The Relative Efficiency of Manipulated Lindahl Mechanisms,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(4), pages 565-598, August.
- Nigar Hashimzade & Gareth Myles, 2008. "Announcement or Contribution? The Relative Efficiency of Manipulated Lindahl Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 0812, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Guoqiang Tian & Liyan Yang, 2009. "Theory of negative consumption externalities with applications to the economics of happiness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(3), pages 399-424, June.
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