Cost Sharing : Efficiency and Implementation
We study environments where a production process is jointly shared by a finite group of agents. The social decision involves the determination of input contribution and output distribution. We define a competitive solution when there is decreasing returns-to-scale and show that it leads to a Pareto optimal outcome.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.|
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/foerder/about
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- Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc & Cornet, Bernard, 1990.
"Existence of Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibria in Economies with Several Nonconvex Firms,"
Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 661-682, May.
- BONNISSEAU, Jean-Marc & CORNET, Bernard, "undated". "Existence of marginal cost pricing equilibria in economies with several nonconvex firms," CORE Discussion Papers RP 941, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kamiya, K., 1986.
"On the survival assumption in marginal cost pricing,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1986038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kamiya, Kazuya, 1988. "On the survival assumption in marginal (cost) pricing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 261-273, April.
- Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-1037, September.
- Hal R. Varian, 1994.
"A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed},"
- Varian, Hal R, 1994. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1278-1293, December.
- Varian, H,R., 1991. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed," Papers 10, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Young, H.P., 1994. "Cost allocation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 34, pages 1193-1235 Elsevier.
- Hong, Lu, 1995. "Nash Implementation in Production Economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(3), pages 401-417, May.
- Kamiya, Kazuya, 1988.
"Existence and uniqueness of equilibria with increasing returns,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 149-178, April.
- KAMIYA, Kazuya, 1987. "Existence and uniqueness of equilibria with increasing returns," CORE Discussion Papers 1987040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
- Calsamiglia, Xavier, 1977. "Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 263-283, April.
- Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1990. "Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-299, April.
- CORNET, Bernard, 1988. "Marginal cost pricing and Pareto optimality," CORE Discussion Papers 1988037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July.
- Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1986.
"Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies,"
649, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
- Paulina Beato, 1982. "The Existence of Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibria with Increasing Returns," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 669-688.
- Schmeidler, David, 1980. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1585-1593, November.
- L. Hurwicz, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 217-225.
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