A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent
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- Kfir Eliaz, 2002. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 589-610.
- Navin Kartik, 2008.
"Strategic Communication with Lying Costs,"
2008 Meeting Papers
350, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
- Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1996. "An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 32-42, July.
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Glazer, Jacob, 2006. "A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 395-410, December.
- Eliaz, K., 1999. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Papers 21-99, Tel Aviv.
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