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A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent

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  • Jacob Glazer
  • Ariel Rubinstein

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  • Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2011. "A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000258, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000258
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4786969000000000258.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eliaz, K., 1999. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Papers 21-99, Tel Aviv.
    2. Navin Kartik, 2009. "Strategic Communication with Lying Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1359-1395.
    3. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
    4. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1996. "An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 32-42, July.
    5. Kfir Eliaz, 2002. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 589-610.
    6. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2006. "A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 395-410, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2014. "Behavioral Implementation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 2975-3002, October.

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