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Behavioral subgame perfect implementation

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  • Hagiwara, Makoto

Abstract

We examine implementation problems in settings where individuals’ choice behavior may not be rational and sequential game forms are considered. First, we present an example in which a social choice rule that is not implementable in “behavioral” Nash equilibria (Proposition 6 in de Clippel (2014)) can be implemented in behavioral subgame perfect equilibria using a three-stage game form. Subsequently, we explore the use of sequential game forms in general implementation problems and provide a necessary condition and two sufficient conditions for implementability in behavioral subgame perfect equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Hagiwara, Makoto, 2025. "Behavioral subgame perfect implementation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:233:y:2025:i:c:s016726812500112x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106992
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Behavioral implementation; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Bounded rationality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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