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A Model of Complex Contracts

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  • Alexander M. Jakobsen

Abstract

I study a mechanism design problem involving a principal and a single, boundedly rational agent. The agent transitions among belief states by combining current beliefs with up to K pieces of information at a time. By expressing a mechanism as a complex contract—a collection of clauses, each providing limited information about the mechanism—the principal manipulates the agent into believing truthful reporting is optimal. I show that such bounded rationality expands the set of implementable functions and that optimal contracts are robust not only to variation in K , but to several plausible variations on the agent's cognitive procedure.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander M. Jakobsen, 2020. "A Model of Complex Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(5), pages 1243-1273, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:5:p:1243-73
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190283
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Abeler & David Huffman & Collin Raymond & David B. Huffman, 2023. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision," CESifo Working Paper Series 10541, CESifo.
    2. Bhavook Bhardwaj & Siddharth Chatterjee, 2022. "Decisions over Sequences," Papers 2203.00070, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    3. Abeler, Johannes & Huffman, David B. & Raymond, Collin, 2023. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision," IZA Discussion Papers 16284, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Guarino, Pierfrancesco & Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022. "Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 559-585.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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