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Choice and individual welfare

Author

Listed:
  • Chambers, Christopher P.
  • Hayashi, Takashi

Abstract

We propose an abstract method of systematically assigning a “rational” ranking to non-rationalizable choice data. Our main idea is that any method of ascribing welfare to an individual as a function of choice is subjective, and depends on the economist undertaking the analysis. We provide a simple example of the type of exercise we propose. Namely, we define an individual welfare functional as a mapping from stochastic choice functions into weak orders. A stochastic choice function (or choice distribution) gives the empirical frequency of choices for any possible opportunity set (framing factors may also be incorporated into the model). We require that for any two alternatives x and y, if our individual welfare functional recommends x over y given two distinct choice distributions, then it also recommends x over y for any mixture of the two choice distributions. Together with some mild technical requirements, such an individual welfare functional must weight every opportunity set and assign a utility to each alternative x which is the sum across all opportunity sets of the weighted probability of x being chosen from the set. It therefore requires us to have a “prior view” about how important or representative a choice of x at a given situation is.
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Suggested Citation

  • Chambers, Christopher P. & Hayashi, Takashi, 2008. "Choice and individual welfare," Working Papers 1286, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1286
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    File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1286.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Nishimura, Hiroki, 2018. "The transitive core: inference of welfare from nontransitive preference relations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    3. Boissonnet, Niels & Ghersengorin, Alexis & Gleyze, Simon, 2020. "Revealed Deliberate Preference Changes," MPRA Paper 101756, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Xiangyu Qu, 2016. "Commitment and anticipated utilitarianism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 349-358, August.
    5. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsatz, 2016. "Do we agree? Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(2), pages 313-339, February.
    6. Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Daisuke Nakajima, 2015. "Completing Incomplete Revealed Preference Under Limited Attention," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 285-299, September.
    7. Hiroki Nishimura, 2014. "The Transitive Core: Inference of Welfare from Nontransitive Preference Relations," Working Papers 201419, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
    8. Sebastian Silva-Leander & Suman Seth, 2017. "Revealed preferences with plural motives: axiomatic foundations of normative assessments in non-utilitarian welfare economics," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 505-517, March.
    9. Niels Boissonnet & Alexis Ghersengorin, 2025. "Grabbing the Forbidden Fruit: Restriction-Sensitive Choice," Papers 2509.11673, arXiv.org.
    10. Gerelt Tserenjigmid, 2021. "The Order-Dependent Luce Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(11), pages 6915-6933, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis

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