Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects
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- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2012. "Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.
- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2009. "Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 7414, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-07-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-07-27 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2007-07-27 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2007-07-27 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-07-27 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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