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Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Stephen Morris

A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 122247000000002286.

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Date of creation: 28 Jul 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002286
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  1. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2009. "Robust virtual implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(1), March.
  2. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2010. "Rationalizable Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1697R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Ex Post Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1502, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1609rr is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001188, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1666, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March.
  10. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November.
  11. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
  12. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 668-91, June.
  13. repec:oup:restud:v:59:y:1992:i:4:p:757-75 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Working Papers 2002-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  15. Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 111-125, January.
  16. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1561rr is not listed on IDEAS
  17. John Duggan, 1997. "Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1175-1200, September.
  18. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2008. "Nash implementation without no-veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 51-67, September.
  19. Bergemann, Dirk & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2009.
  20. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-42, November.
  21. Lipman Barton L., 1994. "A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 114-129, January.
  22. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
  23. Gale, David, 1989. "The Theory of Linear Economic Models," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226278841.
  24. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1313, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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