IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Stephen Morris
  • Satoru Takahashi

We identify a universal type space of possible interdependent (expected utility) preferences of a group of agents satisfying two criteria. First, a type consists of a "detail free" description, in a natural language, of the agents' interdependent preferences. Second, distinct types in the universal type space must be "strategically distinguishable" in the sense that there must exist a mechanism where those types are guaranteed to behave differently in equilibrium. Our results generalize and unify results of Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) (who characterized strategic distinguishability on fixed finite type spaces) and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), (2007) (who characterized strategic distinguishability on type spaces without preference uncertainty and thus without interdependent preferences).

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4786969000000000054.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 786969000000000054.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 20 Mar 2011
Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000054
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Chambers, Christopher P., 2008. "Proper scoring rules for general decision models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 32-40, May.
  2. Harry J. Paarsch & Han Hong, 2006. "An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262162350, March.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000273, David K. Levine.
  4. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2093, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Epstein, Larry G & Wang, Tan, 1996. ""Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1343-73, November.
  6. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
  7. Yi-Chun Chen & Alfredo Di Tillio & Eduardo Faingold & Siyang Xiong, 2012. "The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000517, David K. Levine.
  8. Yildiz, Muhamet, 2015. "Invariance to representation of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 142-156.
  9. Ganguli, Jayant & Heifetz, Aviad & Lee, Byung Soo, 2016. "Universal interactive preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 237-260.
  10. repec:esx:essedp:722 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Alfredo Di Tillio, 2006. "Subjective Expected Utility in Games," Working Papers 311, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  12. Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, . "Hierarchies Of Belief And Interim Rationalizability," Discussion Papers 1388, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Pierpaolo Battigalli, . "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  14. Morris, Stephen & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Scholarly Articles 3196333, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  15. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  16. Sprumont, Yves, 2000. "On the Testable Implications of Collective Choice Theories," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 205-232, August.
  17. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
  18. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July.
  19. Hellman, Ziv, 2014. "A game with no Bayesian approximate equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 138-151.
  20. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Penta, 2008. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 340, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  21. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Faruk Gul, 2007. "The Canonical Space for Behavioral Types," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000345, UCLA Department of Economics.
  22. Chambers, Christopher P. & Lambert, Nicolas S., 2014. "Dynamically Eliciting Unobservable Information," Research Papers 3036, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  23. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 668-691, June.
  24. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-42, November.
  25. Gul, Faruk & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2016. "Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 179-208.
  26. Ziv Hellman, 2012. "A Game with No Bayesian Approximate Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp615, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  27. Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Games in Preference Form and Preference Rationalizability," Working Papers 1420, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  28. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000054. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.