Proper scoring rules for general decision models
If a decision maker whose behavior conforms to the max-min expected utility model is faced with a scoring rule for a subjective expected utility decision maker, she will always announce a probability belonging to her set of priors; moreover, for any prior in the set, there is a scoring rule inducing the agent to announce that prior. We also show that on the domain of Choquet expected utility preferences with risk neutral lottery evaluation and totally monotone capacities, proper scoring rules do not exist. This implies the non-existence of proper scoring rules for any larger class of preferences (CEU with convex capacities, multiple priors).
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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