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Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modelling interdependent preferences distinguishing between "payoff types" and "belief types" and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a finite type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of sufficient conditions for efficient partial implementation in this classical auction setting. We report how a canonical language for discussing interdependent types -- developed in a more general setting by Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011) -- applies in this setting and note by example that this canonical language will not allow us to distinguish some types in the payoff type -- belief type language.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d18a/d1846.pdf
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Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1846.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings (May 2012), 102(3): 319-324
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1846
Note: CFP 1360
Contact details of provider: Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
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Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/

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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
  2. Neeman, Z., 1998. "The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design," Papers 93, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2011. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000054, David K. Levine.
  4. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2006. "On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 213-233, 01.
  5. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Informational Size and Efficient Auctions," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 13 Apr 2003.
  6. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
  7. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  8. Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2012. "Locally robust implementation and its limits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2439-2452.
  9. Yi‐Chun Chen & Siyang Xiong, 2013. "Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 825-847, 03.
  10. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1987. "A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 191-200, April.
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