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On Robust Constitution Design

  • Auriol, Emmanuelle
  • Gary-Bobo, Robert

We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the distribution of preference types. In addition, there is no benevolent planner. An individual who cannot be assumed impartial, a self-interested executive, will carry out decisions. These assumptions impose new constraints on Mechanism Design. A robust mechanism is defined as maximizing expected welfare under a vague prior probability distribution, and over a set of mechanisms which is at the same time immune from opportunistic manipulations by the executive, and compatible with truthful revelation of preferences by representatives. Robust mechanisms are characterized and their existence is shown. Sampling Groves mechanisms are shown to be robust.

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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 136.

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Date of creation: Dec 2001
Date of revision: Aug 2006
Publication status: Published in Theory and Decision, vol.�62, n°3, mai 2007, p.�241-279.
Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:657
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  1. Dennis Mueller & Robert Tollison & Thomas Willett, 1972. "Representative democracy via random selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 57-68, March.
  2. Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2000. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 203-238, May.
  3. Jeff Ely, 2003. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000064, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Maskin, Eric & Moore, John, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, January.
  7. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
  8. Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert J. Gary-Bobo, 1998. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," Discussion Papers 1286, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
  10. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 2002. "On Robust Constitution Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3303, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," IDEI Working Papers 81, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  12. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521424585 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Hagerty, Kathleen M. & Rogerson, William P., 1987. "Robust trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 94-107, June.
  14. Moulin, H., 1986. "Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 53-78, October.
  15. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1979. "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1137-44, September.
  16. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 17-40, October.
  17. Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, 1984. "Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms and Perfect Competition," UCLA Economics Working Papers 333, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. Ledyard, John O., 1978. "Incentive compatibility and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 171-189, June.
  19. Gordon Tullock, 1977. "Practical problems and practical solutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 27-35, March.
  20. Ilya Segal, 2003. "Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 509-529, June.
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