Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John O. Ledyard & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1994.
"Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms,"
Game Theory and Information
9405003, EconWPA, revised 22 May 1994.
- John O. Ledyard & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1994. "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 327-355.
- Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., "undated". "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms," Working Papers 717, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981.
"Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information,"
495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-1819, November.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
- George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 351-367.
- Rajat Deb & Laura Razzolini & Tae Seo, 2006. "The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(3), pages 205-232, December.
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Cremer, Jacques & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1990.
"Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 233-254, August.
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, "undated". "Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP 902, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Cordoba, Jose M. & Hammond, Peter J., 1998.
"Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 185-212, December.
- Cornelli, Francesca, 1996. "Optimal Selling Procedures with Fixed Costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-30, October.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Manelli, Alejandro M., 1997. "Approximately Competitive Equilibria in Large Finite Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 354-376, December.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1507-1520, September.
- John Duggan, 1997. "Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1175-1200, September.
- Hervé Moulin, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 305-325.
- Dearden, James A., 1997. "Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 153-174, October.
- Green, Jerry & Kohlberg, Elon & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1976. "Partial equilibrium approach to the free-rider problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 375-394, November.
- Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "On the provision of excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 111-130, April.
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