A fair pivotal mechanism for nonpecuniary public goods
The Clarke pivotal mechanism is inappropriate for nonpecuniary public goods, because the assumption of quasilinear utility is invalid, and because the mechanism gives disproportionate influence to wealthier voters. But by introducing a `stochastic' Clarke tax, we can convert any separable utility function into a quasilinear one. Also, by stratifying a large population by wealth, and applying different `weights' to the votes from different wealth-strata, we can ensure that the mechanism is `fair' in the sense that the voters in different strata all have equal influence (on average) over the outcome. These weights can be fine-tuned to their optimal values over time, by using the rich dataset generated by a series of large-population referenda. The result is a fair, strategy-proof implementation of weighted utilitarian social choice over nonpecuniary public goods.
|Date of creation:||04 Nov 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anthony B. Atkinson & Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, 2011.
"Top Incomes in the Long Run of History,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-71, March.
- Wojciech Kopczuk & Emmanuel Saez, 2004.
"Top Wealth Shares in the United States: 1916-2000: Evidence from Estate Tax Returns,"
NBER Working Papers
10399, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kopczuk, Wojciech & Saez, Emmanuel, 2004. "Top Wealth Shares in the United States, 1916-2000: Evidence from Estate Tax Returns," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 57(2), pages 445-87, June.
- Green, Jerry & Kohlberg, Elon & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1976. "Partial equilibrium approach to the free-rider problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 375-394, November.
- Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
- Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2000.
"Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 203-238, May.
- R. J. Gary-Bobo & T. Jaaidane, 1996. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," THEMA Working Papers 96-31, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Bailey, Martin J, 1997. " The Demand Revealing Process: To Distribute the Surplus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 107-26, April.
- Edward N. Wolff, 2010. "Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States-- Rising Debt and the Middle-Class Squeeze--An Update to 2007," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_589, Levy Economics Institute.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:34525. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.