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The Demand Revealing Process: To Distribute the Surplus

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  • Bailey, Martin J
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    Abstract

    Contrary to the established, frequently repeated proposition that its budget surplus cannot be distributed to taxpayers without disturbing the incentive compatibility of the demand-revealing process (DRP), the surplus can be distributed by reapplying the key concept of the DRP. There will remain an aggregate refund error that in a Bayesian sense is random with zero mean, and which vanishes O(1/N)-square as the economy becomes large through replication. To deal with income effects, when one does not restrict the domain of the mechanism to separable utility functions, the author suggests a variation of the DRP that preserves its incentive compatibility when N is finite. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 91 (1997)
    Issue (Month): 2 (April)
    Pages: 107-126

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:91:y:1997:i:2:p:107-26
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

    Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2

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    Cited by:

    1. Efthymios Athanasiou & Santanu Dey & Giacomo Valletta, 2016. "Groves mechanisms and communication externalities," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(1), pages 1-37, March.
    2. Sprumont, Yves, 2013. "Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1102-1121.
    3. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Kohei Shiozawa, 2016. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms for Public Decision with Money," ISER Discussion Paper 0964, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    4. Guo, Mingyu & Conitzer, Vincent, 2009. "Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 69-98, September.
    5. Victor Naroditskiy & Richard Steinberg, 2015. "Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 62771, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Naroditskiy, Victor & Polukarov, Maria & Greenwald, Amy & Jennings, Nicholas R., 2014. "Destroy to save," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 392-404.
      • Geoffroy de Clippel & Louis Putterman & Victor Naroditskiy & Maria Polukarov & Amy Greenwald & Nicholas R. Jennings, 2012. "Destroy to Save," Working Papers 2012-9, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    7. Moulin, Hervé, 2009. "Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 96-119, January.
    8. repec:kap:pubcho:v:172:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0411-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Kazuhiko Hashimoto, 2015. "Strategy-Proof Rule in Probabilistic Allocation Problem of an Indivisible Good and Money," ISER Discussion Paper 0931, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    10. McKitrick, Ross & Collinge, Robert A., 2002. "The Existence and Uniqueness of Optimal Pollution Policy in the Presence of Victim Defense Measures," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 106-122, July.
    11. Pivato, Marcus, 2011. "A fair pivotal mechanism for nonpecuniary public goods," MPRA Paper 34525, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Athanasiou Efthymios & Dey Santanu & Valletta Giacomo, 2012. "On Sharing the Benefits of Communication," Research Memorandum 016, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    13. Athanasiou, Efthymios, 2013. "A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 369-387.
    14. You, Jung S., 2015. "Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 166-190.

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