On sharing the benefits of communication
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DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2012016
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Other versions of this item:
- Efthymios Athanasiou & Santanu Dey & Giacomo Valleta, 2012. "On Sharing the Benefits of Communication," Working Papers 2012.41, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2012-09-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-09-16 (Microeconomics)
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