Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
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KeywordsGroves mechanisms; Externality; Budget surplus or deficit; Pareto undominated mechanisms; D70; D62; C60;
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
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