The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
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References listed on IDEAS
- Moulin,Hervi, 1991. "Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521424585, April.
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- Efthymios Athanasiou & Santanu Dey & Giacomo Valletta, 2016. "Groves mechanisms and communication externalities," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(1), pages 1-37, March.
- Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2000.
"Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem,"
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- Rajat Deb & Tae Seo, 2010. "Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 223-236, March.
- Athanasiou Efthymios & Dey Santanu & Valletta Giacomo, 2012. "On Sharing the Benefits of Communication," Research Memorandum 016, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
More about this item
KeywordsStrategy proof; Serial cost sharing; Pivotal mechanism; Asymptotic welfare loss; Efficient surplus; H41; C72; D78;
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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