On Equal Cost Sharing in the Provision of an Excludable Public Good
We study the effciency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, equal cost sharing is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-budgetde cit mechanisms only when there are 2 agents. In general the equal cost
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- Yves Sprumont, 2011.
"Constrained-Optimal Strategy-Proof Assignment: Beyond the Groves Mechanisms,"
Cahiers de recherche
14-2011, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Sprumont, Yves, 2013. "Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1102-1121.
- SPRUMONT, Yves, 2011. "Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms," Cahiers de recherche 2011-09, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
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- Olszewski, Wojciech, 2004. "Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 88-114, January.
- Mutuswami, Suresh, 2005. "Strategyproofness, Non-Bossiness and Group Strategyproofness in a cost sharing model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 83-88, October.
- Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
- Hervé Moulin, 2008. "The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 379-405, September.
- Shinji Ohseto, 2005. "Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 589-606, October.
- Ruben Juarez, 2008. "The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority versus average cost," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 69-84, January.
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