An Experimental Evaluation of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule
This paper proposes an experimental test of the strategic equilibrium properties of the serial cost sharing rule originally proposed by Shenker (1990) and then analyzed by Moulin and Shenker (1992). We report measure of the performance and efficiency of the serial mechanism by comparing the choices and payoffs attained by the subjects to the expected first best allocations. Experimental evidence shows that, while some learning is needed, the serial mechanism leads to almost efficient allocations.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Box 844000, Richmond, VA 23284-4000|
Web page: http://www.business.vcu.edu/economics
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Yan Chen & Laura Razzolini & Theodore Turocy, 2007. "Congestion allocation for distributed networks: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 121-143, October.
- Greenwald, Amy & Friedman, Eric J. & Shenker, Scott, 2001. "Learning in Network Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 80-123, April.
- Friedman, Eric & Shor, Mikhael & Shenker, Scott & Sopher, Barry, 2004. "An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 325-352, May.
- Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
- Eric J Friedman & Scott Schenker, 1997. "Learning and Implementation on the Internet," Levine's Working Paper Archive 595, David K. Levine.
- Hervé Moulin, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 305-325.
- Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura, 1999. "Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 123-138, March.
- Gailmard, Sean & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2005. "An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1361-1398, August.
- Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura, 1999. "Auction-Like Mechanisms for Pricing Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 340-368, October.
- Pamela J. Hinds & Sara Kiesler (ed.), 2002. "Distributed Work," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262083051, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vcu:wpaper:0402. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oleg Korenok)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.