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A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing

Author

Listed:
  • Jesse A. Schwartz

    (Department of Economics, Kennesaw State University)

  • Quan Wen

    (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

We introduce a subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing problems. Although the average, marginal, and serial cost sharing mechanisms are budget-balanced, they are not allocatively efficient and they do not induce players to truthfully reveal their values as a dominant strategy. The conventional Vickrey auction, on the other hand, is allocatively efficient and does induce truthful bidding as a dominant strategy, but also generates an overpayment. This paper modifies the conventional Vickrey auction so that some of the overpayment is used to subsidize additional production without upsetting the players' incentives to bid truthfully. Although this subsidized Vickrey auction is not allocatively efficient, it always Pareto dominates the conventional Vickrey auction and sometimes dominates other existing cost sharing mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Jesse A. Schwartz & Quan Wen, 2007. "A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0705, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0705
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cost sharing; dominant strategy implementation; Vickrey auction; subsidized Vickrey auction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods

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